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FOREIGN CORPORATIONS LENDING MONEY
IN ILLINOIS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROBLEMS
by

ROBERT KRATOVIL*

and

DANIEL A. WEILER**

INTRODUCTION

Without exception, every state, as well as the District of
Columbia, has a statutory provision penalizing foreign corporations which do business in the state without a license.' The
applicability of such a provision invariably depends upon a determination of which activities of the foreign corporation constitute
"doing business."'2 Both legislatures and courts have attempted
* J.D., DePaul University. Professor of Law, The John Marshall
Law School. Mr. Kratovil has, in addition to his teaching responsibilities, authored numerous legal articles as well as several textbooks in the
area of real estate and mortgage law.
**
Currently a senior at The John Marshall Law School.
1. See, e.g., C.T. CORPORATION SYSTEM, WHAT CONSTITUTES DOING
BuSINESS BY A CORPORATION IN STATES FOREIGN TO THE STATE OF ITS CREA-

With respect to
(hereinafter cited as C.T.C.).
TION, passim (1973)
ordinary business corporations, the typical penalty is denial of access to
local courts. Various other special categories of foreign corporations are
subjected to differing requirements and penalties. For example, a
mortgage on Illinois land running to a foreign state savings and loan
association that has "done business" in Illinois in connection with the
transaction is void. See note 160 infra. Foreign insurance companies
also fall under a special statute in Illinois. See note 160 infra.
2. "Doing business" or "transacting business" is used by the courts
in three different contexts: (1) activities which subject a foreign corporation to service of process and in personam jurisdiction of the domestic
courts; (2) activities which subject a foreign corporation to the state's
power to tax; and (3) activities which impose penalties on a foreign corporation if it is not licensed or qualified. The level of activity which
will suffice to be considered doing business is different for each of these
areas and different tests have been applied by the courts in deciding
these questions. One writer has metaphorically described the three concepts as "three concentric circles." The largest circle would include in
personam jurisdiction activities, which include almost any minimum contacts with the state as long as service of process does not violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe
See ILL. REV. STAT.
Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
ch. 110, § 17 (1973). Inside the next largest circle are activities which
subject the foreign corporation to both taxation and service of process.
The test used by the courts is whether there is a sufficient "nexus" or
connection between the foreign corporation's operations and the state.
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 385 U.S. 450
(1959); 15 U.S.C. § 381. The smallest circle contains any activity which
subjects a foreign corporation to the local penalties imposed for failure
to become qualified. Generally the amount of activity falling in this last
category must be much greater than the other two and hence the circle
is smaller. 2 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 581
(1959): 1-4. The terms "doing business" and "transacting business" will
be used in this article only in the final sense, that is, to describe the
amount of activity that will subject a foreign corporation to a penalty
for failure to qualify.
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to define the term "doing business." Initially the courts acted
alone in attempts to concretize the phrase. Subsequently, in
more recent times, legislatures have addressed the issue by
enumerating specific activities which do not constitute doing
business.' In the absence of such legislative clarification, courts
3. Every state except Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New York, Ohio, South Dakota, and Vermont, has a
statute usually relating to ordinary business corporations, that excludes
certain activities from the area of doing business. A statute that has
been adopted by a majority of the states is 2 ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP.
ACT § 106(2) (1971) which reads as follows:
Without excluding other activities which may not constitute
transacting business in this State, a foreign corporation shall not be
considered to be transacting business in this State, for the purposes
of this Act, by reason of carrying on in this State any one or more
of the following activities:
(a) Maintaining or defending any action or suit or any administrative or arbitration proceeding, or effecting the settlement thereof
or the settlement of claims or disputes.
(b) Holding meetings of its directors or shareholders or carrying on other activities concerning its internal affairs.
(c) Maintaining bank accounts.
(d) Maintaining offices or agencies for the transfer, exchange
and registration of its securities, or appointing and maintaining trustees or depositaries with relation to its securities.
(e) Effecting sales through independent contractors.
(f) Soliciting or procuring orders, whether by mail or through
employees or agents or otherwise, where such orders require acceptance without this State before becoming binding contracts.
(g) Creating evidences of debt, mortgages or liens on real or
personal property.
(h) Securing or collecting debts or enforcing any rights in property securing the same.
(i) Transacting any business in interstate commerce.
(j) Conducting an isolated transaction completed within a period of thirty days and not in the course of a number of repeated
transactions of like nature.
Illinois has not adopted this portion of the Model Business Corporation
Act.
As can be seen, sub-paragraph (g) of the above provision is a
masterpiece of ambiguity. Whether it is the borrower or the lender
whose activities are exempted from qualification requirements is left entirely to the imagination. A number of states have enacted versions of
this provision that speak with clarity. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §
2001(7) (1968): "Creating as borrower or lender evidences of debt,
mortgages and rights in real or security interests in personal property"
(emphasis added). In correspondence between one of the authors (Professor Kratovil) and the American Law Institute (ALI), it has been indicated by ALI that this language will be clarified.
A simple example will illustrate the problem. Suppose that ABC
Corporation owns land in all fifty states and is qualified to do business
in each of them. ABC applies to XYZ, a large New York City mortgage
company, for mortgage loans on real estate in each of the states. The
entire transaction, from application for loan to disbursement of the mortgage funds, is handled in New York City. The lender is thus protected
under the "insulation method." See section entitled "The Insulation
Method" infra. However, the lender, XYZ, who is not qualified to do
business in any state outside of New York, engages in certain incidental
activities in each of the states, such as sending personnel to each of the
states to make loan appraisals of the real estate, or making inspections
for construction disbursements. If sub-paragraph (g) refers only to the
borrower, ABC Corporation, then the lender, XYZ, may be subject to
"doing business" defenses on the ground that the lender failed to remain
within the confines of the insulation method. Hence the language of sub-
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have decided the question on an ad hoc basis, examining each
particular factual situation in order to determine whether
business is being done. Their inquiries have included consideration of the total amount of activity carried on within the state,
whether the activity is part of the corporation's regular course
of business, and whether the activity is part of interstate
4
commerce.
The Illinois Business Corporation Act, in its qualification
statute, requires a foreign business corporation to procure a certificate of authority from the Secretary of State before transacting business within the state." The penalty imposed for a corporation's failure to obtain a certificate is the denial of the right
6
to maintain a civil action in any court of the state.
For many years, however, Illinois has singled out one specific
activity, carried on by any type of foreign corporation, that will
not be considered transacting business for purposes of qualification. That activity is lending money in Illinois. 7 This article
will examine this special statutory exception and problems in
construing it." Owing to an amendment in 1953, questions have
arisen as to the scope of this statute and its validity. It is the
purpose of this article, therefore, to explore the question of
whether foreign corporations may legally engage in the business
of lending money in Illinois without qualifying to do business.
ORIGINS OF DOING BUSINESS LAW
The Law Prior to Qualification Statutes
In the early days of the republic, a corporation had no
existence outside the jurisdiction of its incorporation. It was
paragraph (g) needs to be revised to follow the Pennsylvania version.
Obviously the legislative intention is to encourage lending by protecting
the foreign lenders.
4. C.T.C., p. 49.
5. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.102 (1973).
6. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.125 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975),
amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.125 (1973). In addition, the foreign
corporation is liable in an amount equal to the fees and franchise taxes
for the years it acted without a certificate of authority. Id.
7. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 212 (1973) (foreign corporations lending
money in Illinois).
8. Two observations seem relevant at this point. The Illinois Business Corporation Act expressly excludes banks from its scope. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 32, § 157.102 (1973). See also note 61 infra. Also the statute
hereafter considered is a specific statute dealing with a specific topic,
namely, lending by any foreign corporation. In the absence of an express repealer in the present Illinois Business Corporation Act or its
predecessors, the specific statute will be permitted to co-exist with the
general corporate legislation. See text at note 38 infra. These points
are deserving of repetition and emphasis because foreign state banks cannot purge themselves of the "doing business" taint by qualifying in Illinois. The law does not permit this. See text at note 180 infra. Moreover, the point has added weight because banks are today a prime source
of mortgage funds.
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a creature of the law of its state of incorporation.9 An early
Supreme Court case, Bank of Augusta v. Earle,10 recognized this

theory, but refused to extend it. To do so would have established
the rule that the existence of the corporation and its power to
contract should not be recognized outside the boundaries of the
state that created it." On the contrary, the Court held that
as long as a state had not expressly indicated that contracts made
by a foreign corporation were repugnant to its policy or injurious to its interests, the law of comity should be applied and
the state should recognize the validity 12 of the contracts and
permit the corporation to sue in its courts.
At that time there were only two areas in which the states
had attempted to regulate or exclude foreign corporations:
banking and insurance.' 3 Prior to the General Incorporation
14
Act of 1872, Illinois had statutes regulating both these areas.
There was nothing else to indicate a policy of excluding foreign
corporations. Indeed these statutes provided an inference that
foreign corporations were welcome in Illinois.
The General Incorporation Act of 187215 prohibited foreign
corporations in general from purchasing or holding real estate
in Illinois and limited the powers of foreign corporations to those
possessed by domestic corporations. 6 At one time, the Su9. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839);
H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, §§ 89, 98 (2d ed.
1970). Federal corporations, such as national banks and federal savings
and loan associations, present unique problems not within the scope of
this article. See, however, text at notes 172, 177, 184, & 187 infra.
10. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).

11. Id. at 588.

12. Id. at 589-92.
13. See, e.g., the laws cited in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 519, 592 (1839); see Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869)
(statute excluding insurance companies that failed to obtain a license).
14. See Act of March 3, 1845, ch. XV, §§ 1-3, [1845] Rev. Stat. of
Ill. 84 (repealed 1867) (imposing penalty for passing notes issued by foreign banks of less denomination than five dollars); Act of March 3, 1845,
ch. 64, §§ 22-23, [1845] Rev. Stat. of Ill., 344 (repealed 1869) replaced
by Act of March 11, 1869, ch. 53a, § 22, [1869] Ill. Laws, 136 (repealed
1879) (statutes requiring agents of foreign insurance companies to comply with certain requirements before carrying on an insurance business
in Illinois).
15. Act of April 18, 1872, ch. 32, §§ 1-49, [1871-72] Ill. Laws, 296 (repealed 1919), REV. STAT. ILL. ch. 32, §§ 1-49 (Hurd 1874). ILL. CONST.
art. X, § 1 (1870) provided that no corporation could be created by special
law. The General Assembly was required to provide for a General Incorporation Statute. The practice of incorporation by special law was
subject to much abuse and corruption. See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 12 (2d ed. 1970).
The result was the passage
of the 1872 law.

16. Act of April 18, 1872, ch. 32, § 26 [1871-72] Ill. Laws 302-03 (now
§ 157.103 (1973)), REv. STAT. ILL. ch. 32, § 26, (Hurd
1874), provided:
Foreign corporations, and the officers and agents thereof doing

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32,

business in this state, shall be subjected to all liabilities, restrictions

and duties that are or may be imposed upon corporations of like
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preme Court of Illinois interpreted this section as manifesting
a public policy against foreign corporations lending money in
Illinois. 17 The court later re-examined this holding and in Stevens v. Pratt' decided that its former decision resulted from
an erroneous reading of the statute.' 9 It is clear from Stevens
that Illinois followed the general rule of Bank of Augusta v.
Earle20 which allowed for recognition of the validity of foreign
corporation contracts and which permitted foreign corporations
to sue to enforce them under the principle of comity. It is also
clear that, at that time, foreign corporations could lend money
in Illinois without violating any state policy.
The Passage of the Lending Statute
The greatest single event which precipitated the passage of
the Illinois lending statute21 was the great Chicago Fire of 1871.
After the fire, a period of feverish building and land speculation
took place. 22 Much of the new building was financed by
eastern money. 23 Interest rates were high and down payments
small. 24 As a result, the feverish building boom was followed
by an inevitable bust. With the bust came declining land values
and bank failures. 25 By 1875 the rate of foreclosure was soarcharacter organized under the general laws of this state, and shall
have no greater powers. And no foreign or domestic corporation established or maintained in any way for the pecuniary profit of its
shareholders or members, shall purchase or hold real estate in this
state, except as provided for in this act.
17. U.S. Mortgage Co. v. Gross, 93 Ill. 483, 492-93 (1879), aff'd 108
U.S. 477 (1883). The court reasoned that since the first section of the
act provided that corporations could not be formed under the act for
loaning money, and since under § 26 a foreign corporation could have
no greater powers than a domestic corporation, lending money by a foreign corporation in Illinois was obnoxious to the policy of the state, id.
at 493.
18. 101 Ill. 206 (1882).
19. The court decided that the failure of the legislature to provide
for a particular class of incorporations (corporations organized to lend
money) was equivocal.: Since the intention to exclude the foreign corporations could have easily been shown, the court declined to assume
that this was the policy of Illinois since it was not clearly expressed.
Id. at 219-20.
20. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). Indeed, Stevens v. Pratt, 101 Ill.
206, 222-23 (1882) expressly cited and followed Bank of Augusta. The
rule of comity still exists in Illinois. People v. New York Title & Mortgage Co., 346 Ill. 278, 282, 178 N.E. 661, 663 (1931).
21. Act of April 9, 1875, ch. 32, § 72, [1875] Ill. Laws 65 (now ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 212 (1973)), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 72 (Underwood
(1878)).
22. HOYT, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LAND VALUES IN CHICAGO, 102
(1933) (hereinafter cited as HOYT).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 104. The interest rate was eight percent per annum and
the loans were due in five years. The down-payment was often only
a tenth of the purchase price, and a purchase money mortgage trust deed
was given for the remainder. Id. at 117-18.
25. Id. at 119-20. The Panic of 1873 was characterized by the crash
of the stock market, bank suspensions and commercial failures. New
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ing. 26 The plight of the mortgagor who had borrowed eastern
money was aggravated by the fact that in the federal courts a
even
redemption period of only one hundred days was permitted,
27
though Illinois allowed a twelve month redemption period.
Against this background of scarce mortgage money and
harsh federal court procedure, the Illinois General Assembly took
action. In 1875 it passed a statute which enabled "any" foreign
corporation "to invest or loan money" in Illinois, and declared
that foreign corporations had the same rights and access to state
courts for purposes of recovering loans or enforcing securities
in connection with loans as did citizens of Illinois. 28

The legis-

York felt the impact immediately, while the depression affected Chicago
more slowly. In the four-year period from 1873 to 1877, twenty-one
banks failed in Chicago, including its largest savings and loan. Id.
26. Id. at 124.
27. See Brine v. Ins. Co., 96 U.S. 627 (1877); see HOYT at 123. This
practice was ended in 1877 by the United States Supreme Court in Brine
v. Ins. Co., 96 U.S. 627 (1877), which declared that the federal courts
must follow the Illinois redemption period in mortgage foreclosures. See
also Sutterlin v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 90 Ill. 483 (1878).
28. Act of April 9, 1875, ch. 32, § 72 [1875] Ill. Laws 65 (now ILL.
Rgv. STAT. ch. 32, § 212 (1973)); ILL. RFv. STAT. ch. 32, § 72 (Underwood
(1878)). This law (sometimes herein referred to as "the lending statute"), as originally enacted, read as follows:
AN ACT to enable corporations in other states and countries to
lend money in Illinois, to enforce their securities and acquire title
to real estate as security.
SECTON 1. Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois,
represented in the General Assembly, That any corporation formed
under the laws of any other state or country, and authorized by its
charter to invest or loan money, may invest or loan money in this
state. And any such corporation that may have invested or lent
money, as aforesaid, may have the same rights and powers for the
recovery thereof, subject to the same penalties for usury, as private
persons, citizens of this state; and when a sale is made under any
judgment, decree or power in a mortgage or deed, such corporation
may purchase, in its corporate name, the property offered for sale,
and become vested with the title wherever a natural person might
do so in like cases: Provided, however, that all real estate so purchased by any such corporation, in satisfaction of any such liability
or indebtedness, shall be offered at public auction, at least once
every year, at the door of the courthouse of the county wherein the
same may be situated, or on the premises so to be sold, after giving
notice thereof for at least four consecutive weeks, in some newspaper
of general circulation, published in said county; and if there be no
such newspaper published therein, then in the nearest adjacent
county where such newspaper is published; and said real estate shall
be sold whenever the price offered for it is not less than the claim
of such corporation, including all interest, cost and other expenses:
And, provided, further, that in case such corporation shall not, within
such period of five years, sell such lands, either at public or private
sale, as aforesaid, it shall be the duty of the state's attorney to proceed by information in the name of the People of the State of Illinois,
against such corporation, in the circuit court of the county within
which such land, so neglected to be sold, shall be situated, and such
court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine the fact, and to
order the sale of such land or real estate, at such time and place,
subject to such rules as the court shall establish. The court shall

tax, as the fees of the state's attorney, such sum as shall be reason-

able; and the proceeds of such sale, after deducting the said fees and
costs of proceedings, shall be paid over to such corporation: And,
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lation was successful. The resulting flow of eastern money to
Illinois helped Chicago's economy stage a recovery in 1878 and
1879.29

The cycle was repeated when the resulting period of growth
was followed by a second depression in 1896.30 Just as in 1875,
the General Assembly passed a second lending statute in 1897.
The 1897 legislation was virtually identical with the 1875 law."'
Besides the lending statute, there was another law passed
during the 1897 session which concerned foreign corporations. It
was the first Illinois qualification statute. It required every foreign corporation which intended to transact business within
Illinois to maintain an office in the state and to file a copy of
its charter with the Secretary of State.3 2 The penalty for failure to procure a certificate was a fine and the denial of access
33
to state courts to maintain any action.
The qualification statute contained a section providing for
34
the repeal of all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with it.
If lending money in Illinois was considered transacting business,
then the lending statute on its face was inconsistent with the
qualification law, since, under the lending statute, a foreign corporation neither had to obtain a certificate of authority nor maintain an office in Illinois in order to lend money in the state.
However, there was no express repeal of the lending statute, so
it could only have been repealed by implication, if at all. Yet,
provided, further, that nothing in this act contained shall be so construed as to confer banking powers or privileges upon any such corporation.
It is significant that the legislature chose to extend the benefits of
the statute to "any corporation." The word "any" admits of no exceptions. Port City Constr. Co. v. Adams & Douglas, Inc., 273 A.2d 121
(1971); Shattuch v. Grider, 493 P.2d 829 (1972). Foreign money was
welcome, regardless of the source.
29. HoYT at 128-31.
30. Id. at 181.
31. Act of May 24, 1897, ch. 32, § 67a, [1897] Ill. Laws 176 (now ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 212 (1973)). While the 1897 law was referred to
as a "re-enactment" of the 1875 law in Richardson v. U.S. Mortgage &
Trust Co., 194 Ill. 259, 265, 62 N.E. 606, 608 (1902), technically it was
not, since the 1875 law was not repealed at the same time. In fact, the
1875 statute was published in the Illinois Revised Statutes as ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 32, § 67 and after 1921, as ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 32, § 211. This
continued until 1939, when the General Assembly did some wholesale
repealing of statutes that had been superseded by other laws. See Act
of July 13, 1939 [1939]; Ill. Laws 1175, 1177 (repealing the 1875 law).
See note 44 infra. In ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 211, Commentary at 206
(Smith-Hurd 1970), it is stated, relative to the 1875 Act that "[t]his sub-

ject matter is covered by § 212 of this Chapter." At all events, legisla-

tion substantially in its original 1875 form was part of the Illinois law,
unchanged until it was amended in 1953.
32. Act of May 26, 1897, ch. 32, § 67b-e [1897], Ill. Laws 174 (now
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.102 (1973)); ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 32, § 67be (Hurd 1897).
33. Id. at § 3, ch. 32, § 67d.

34. Id. at § 4, ch. 32, § 67e.
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the general rule of statutory construction followed in Illinois is
that statutes relating to the same subject matter and passed at
the same session of the legislature must be considered in par/
materia and construed with reference to each other, so that both,
if possible, may be given effect. 35 This rule restates the presumption that there is no implied repeal where statutes are
enacted by the same legislative session. 36 Applying these rules,
it is unlikely that the General Assembly intended to repeal the
1897 lending statute by passage of the qualification statute only
37
two days later.
A related rule of construction provides that a particular or
specific enactment prevails over a general provision on the same
subject in the same or related laws.8 Here, the qualification
statute concerned foreign corporations transacting business in
general, while the lending statute provided for a particular type
of transaction, namely lending. Thus the provisions of the lending statute would seem to take precedence over the qualification
statute. Whatever the intention of the legislature may have been
in inserting the repealer section in the qualification statute, the
inconsistency, if there was one, went unnoticed by the courts.
The lending statute was treated as if it were in full force and
effect. 39
In 1905 another statute was enacted by the General Assembly
which required foreign corporations to qualify before transacting
business in Illinois. 40 This statute contained a section repealing
the earlier qualification law which had been amended in 1899;
41
it also repealed all acts and parts of acts in conflict with it.
Since the repealer section did not specifically mention our lending statute, the lending statute was repealed, if at all, by impli42
cation. In Illinois, repeals by implication are not favored.
35. People ex rel. Vaughan v. Thompson, 377 Ill. 244, 249, 36 N.E.2d
351, 353 (1941); Frank v. Salomon, 376 Ill. 439, 445-46, 34 N.E.2d 424, 427
(1941); Hunt v. Chicago Horse & Dummy Ry., 121 Ill. 638, 644-45, 13
N.E. 176, 177-78 (1887); 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONsTRUCTION § 51.03, at n.17 (4th ed. C. Sands 1972) [hereinafter cited as
SUTHERLAND].

36. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 297 (1953); 2A

SUTHERLAND § 51.01 at n.9.
37. The lending statute was enacted May 24, 1897, and the qualification statute was enacted May 26, 1897.
38. Frank v. Salomon, 376 Ill. 439, 446, 34 N.E.2d 424, 427 (1941).
39. In Richardson v. U.S. Mortgage & Trust Co., 194 Ill. 259, 265, 62
N.E. 606, 608 (1902), the court noted that the two statutes were passed
in the same session but did not discuss any possible repeal or inconsistency between them.
40. Act of May 18, 1905, ch. 32, § 67b-f, [1905], Il. Laws 121 (now
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.102 (1973)), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 67bf (Hurd 1905).
41. Id. at § 67i.
42. People ex rel. Kerner v. United Medical Service, 362 Ill. 442, 200
N.E. 157 (1936); Hunt v. Chicago Horse and Dummy Ry., 121 Ill.
638, 644, 13 N.E. 176, 177 (1887). The duty of the courts is to construe
the two statutes to avoid repeal by implication. See 1A SUTHERLAND §

23.10.
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Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court interpreted the 1905 qualification statute as a continuation of the 1897 enactment rather
than a repeal of it. 43 No major changes were made by the
1905 law. In short, our lending statute survived.
Other evidence that the lending statute was not repealed by
either the 1897 or the 1905 laws is that it continued to appear
in the revisions of the Illinois Revised Statutes. 44 Even more
convincing is the fact that the General Assembly amended it in
1953. 4 5 The General Assembly must have deemed the 1897 lending statute as one which had continuing vitality. Thus it seems
that from an historic and legislative point of view, the basic provisions found in the original 1875 law remained effective through
1953, and any foreign corporation was allowed to invest or loan
money in Illinois without having to qualify.
LENDING MONEY AS "DOING BusINEss"
The case law of "doing business" is a quagmire. This is due
in part to variations in the statutes, 46 as well as to an evolutionary trend away from the early punitive statutes which made
43. White Sewing Machine Co. v. Harris, 252 111. 361, 366-67, 96 N.E.
857, 859 (1911). The notion of implied repeal appears in the dissenting
opinion in the Appellate Court decision. White Sewing Machine Co. v.
Harris, 161 Ill. App. 122, 129-32 (1910).
44. The 1897 lending statute was placed by Hurd, the official reviser
of the 1874 statutes, in the Illinois Revised Statutes as ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 32, § 67a immediately following the 1875 lending statute (§ 67), and
the 1897 qualification law was placed immediately after the lending statutes as ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 67b-e. In 1919, when the General Corporation Act was enacted, the qualification statute was moved to another
part of chapter 32 as ILL. Rzv. STAT., ch. 32, § 28a52-67. But the lending
statutes remained as § 67 and § 67a until 1921, when they were moved
to § 211 and § 212' by Burdette J. Smith & Co., who published the Illinois statutes under the authority of the General Assembly. The lending
statutes have since remained there. See note 31 supra.
The officially authorized publishers of the Illinois statutes correctly
concluded that the General Corporation Act of 1919 did not impliedly
repeal the statute here discussed. In addition to the fact that our statute
is a specific statute that normally prevails over a general statute (see
text at note 38 supra), our lending statute deals with a variety of foreign
corporations not within the scope of the General Corporation Act or its
successor, the present Business Corporation Act. Furthermore, the fact
that the specific repealers contained in the general acts made no mention
of our statute is dispositive of the matter. See Act of June 28, 1919, ch.
32, § 28a126, [1919] Ill. Laws, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 28a126 (Hurd
1919) (specific repealer section of the General Corporation Act); ILL.
REV. STAT., ch. 32, § 157.167 (1973) (specific repealer section of the Business Corporation Act). Therefore, a version of our original lending statute is in force in Illinois today, even though an erroneous opinion of the
Illinois Attorney General takes the view that the Business Corporation
Act of 1933 impliedly repealed the lending statute. ILL. ATr'Y GEN. OP.
323 (1940).
45. Act of July 15, 1953 [1953] Ill. Laws 1508, amending ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 32, § 212 (1951) (now ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 212 (1973)).
46. See C.T.C. passim; 17 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8464 (1960).
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transactions of unlicensed foreign corporations void. 47 These
early statutes compelled courts to resort to evasive devices to
avoid punitive statutory results. 48 Other historical aberrations
have also played a part. For example, before the turn of the
century, the so-called national building and loan associations
roamed the country making imprudent high interest loans.
When these mortgages went into foreclosure, the courts turned
handsprings to find violations of the "doing business" law. Few
of these decisions would be adhered to today. 49 To explore this
morass in depth would be counter productive, and reference is
made to other sources.50 Few of the Illinois opinions shed any
light on the doing business issue, and none fully interpret the
lending statute itself.
Illinois Cases
Cases not citing the lending statute
Illinois cases on lending money can be divided into two
groups, those in which the court uses authority other than the
lending statute, and those interpreting or relying on the lending
statute. The cases not relying on the statute decided that a
foreign corporation was not doing business for a number of
reasons. A foreign corporation was not doing business by lending money when making loans did not constitute the business
for which the corporation was organized. 51 Where a promis-

sory note signed by Illinois residents in Illinois was apparently
completed in the corporation's Missouri office, the corporation
was not doing business in Illinois. The activities constituted
47. Compare John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Girard, 57 Idaho 198,

64 P.2d 254 (1936) with Land Dev. Corp. v. Cannaday, 74 Idaho 233, 258
P.2d 976 (1953).
48. For example, the courts developed the "isolated transaction"
theory. See, e.g., Charter Fin. Co. v. Henderson, 60 Ill. 2d 323, 327, 326
N.E.2d 372, 375 (1975); Plew v. Board, 274 Ill. 232, 236, 113, N.E. 603,
605 (1916); Alpena Cement Co. v. Jenkins Co., 244 Ill. 354, 91 N.E. 480
(1910); text at note 157 infra.
49. See H. RussEL, SAVINGS & LOAN ASS'Ns 27. For an overview of
the strained metaphysical reasoning courts used to invalidate loans made
by foreign building and loan associations see Annot., 62 L.R.A. 33, 6972 (1904). This annotation strives to distinguish the cases as to which
law governs the loan in a conflict of laws situation, on the basis of "good
faith," an elusive standard. A modern, more satisfactory approach is
found in Cooper v. Cherokee Village Dev. Co., 236 Ark. 37, 364 S.W.2d
158, 162 (1963) in which the court stated: "This court has consistently
inclined toward applying the law of the state that will make the contract
valid, rather than void." The court, in that case, chose to follow the

law of New York, where the loan agreement was executed, which re-

sulted in the loan being valid despite Arkansas' strict usury law.
50. See 17 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 8464-8502 (1960); 20 C.J.S. Corporations§§ 1828-42 (1940).
51. Auto. Material Co. v. Am. Standard Metal Prods. Corp., 327 Ill.
367, 375, 158 N.E. 698, 701 (1927),
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either an isolated transaction, or a transaction in interstate commerce. 52 When a corporation without an office in Illinois
loaned money and purchased commercial paper at a discount,
which was secured by chattel mortgages on automobiles in Illinois, and the documents were accepted outside the state by mail
or by sight draft, the foreign corporation was not doing business
in Illinois.53 When a loan was made in connection with a transaction that was a matter of interstate commerce, it was found
54
not to be doing business within fllinois.
A Seventh Circuit case, In re Diversified Development
Corp.,55 reports an earlier trial court decision of an Illinois court
holding that a mortgage taken by a Missouri banking corporation securing a loan to an Illinois corporation was unenforceable
in the Illinois courts. 56 However, the bankruptcy court held
that the foreign corporation was entitled to the rights of a
petitioning creditor in reorganization proceedings, since filing a
claim in bankruptcy is not the filing of a suit, and a bankruptcy
court does not sit as if it were another state court. 57 Therefore,
the Illinois statutory penalties for failure of a foreign corporation to qualify are inapplicable in bankruptcy. The unreported
Illinois trial court case relied upon by the bankruptcy court as
a statement of state law on the enforceability of the loan seems
erroneous. It completely overlooked the Illinois lending stat58
ute.
Thus, overall, the Illinois cases decided without citing the
lending statute are of little help in determining whether lending
money in Illinois, of itself, constitutes doing business. None of
them aid in an analysis of the business of lending money.
Cases citing the lending statute
A more fruitful approach in determining whether a foreign
corporation is doing business when it is lending money in Illinois
is an examination of Illinois cases interpreting the lending statute and the qualification statute, as well as other related statutes.
One of the other statutes which is frequently discussed in connection with the lending and qualification statutes was enacted as
52. Charter Fin. Co. v. Henderson, 60 Ill. 2d 323, 326 N.E.2d 372
(1975). See text at note 153 infra.
53. Indus. Acceptance Corp. v. Haering, 253 Ill. App. 97 (3d Dist.
1929). This is the leading Illinois decision on the "insulation theory."
See text accompanying note 148 infra.
54. Id. at 106. See also text at note 153 infra.
55. 341 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1965).
56. Id. at 59; see 1 ILL. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 102 at 544-45 (3d
ed. C. Murdock & Chicago Bar Ass'n 1975).
57. In re Diversified Dev. Corp. 341 F.2d 58, 60 (7th Cir. 1965).
58. ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 32, § 212 (1973). The unreported decision has
been read by the authors and is very unilluminating.
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part of the General Incorporation Act of 1872.5 9 The current
law, which is very similar to the original section, provides that
no foreign corporation shall transact any business in Illinois
which a corporation organized within the state is not permitted to transact. 0 Although the General Incorporation Act
of 1872 permitted most corporations for profit to organize for
any lawful purpose, it exhressly failed to provide for organization
of corporations for the purpose of "banking, insurance, real estate
brokerage, the operation of railroads, and the business of loaning money."'
The question arose as to whether these two sections should be read together as prohibiting foreign corporations
from lending money in Illinois, since domestic corporations could
not be organized for the business of loaning money.
The Illinois Supreme Court originally held in United States
Mortgage Co. v. Gross6 2 that the sections did prohibit foreign
,corporations from lending money in Illinois prior to the enactment of the 1875 lending statute. However, three years after the
6 3
Gross -decision, the same court, in Stevens v. Pratt,
reconsidered its earlier construction and deemed it erroneous. In so
doing, it wrote:
[I]t is not therefore to be assumed that the legislature was
unwilling to grant the right to be incorporated for the excepted
purposes in another manner, and subject to other regulations
and restrictions. . . . [I]t may be asserted, without fear of contradiction, that the policy of the State has been to allow banking, insurance, real estate brokerage, the operation of railroads,
and the business of loaning money, either independently or in
connection with or as incidental to other branches of business by
corporations [incorporated under special acts of the legislature] .64
Since many Illinois corporations organized under special
legislation prior to the 1870 Constitution were invested with the
59. It appeared in the first general incorporation act in 1872 as Act
of April 18, 1872, ch. 32, § 26, [1871-72] Ill. Laws 302, (now ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 32, § 157.103 (1973)) Rzv. STAT. ILL. ch. 32, § 26 (Hurd 1874).
For text of the section, see note 16 supra.
60. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.102 (1973).
61. Act of April 18, 1872, ch. 32, § 1, [1871-72] Ill. Laws 296 (now
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.3 (1973)) REv. STAT. ILL. ch. 32, § 1 (Hurd
1874) (emphasis added). The current exceptions to the Business Corporation Act ar, those corporations organized
for the purposes of banking or insurance or the operation of railroads; provided, however, that corporations may be organized under
this Act for the purpose of buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in
notes (not including the discounting of bills and notes and not including the buying and selling of bills of exchange), open accounts,
and other similar evidences of debt.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.3 (1973).
62. 93 Ill. 483 (1879), aff'd, 108 U.S. 477 (1883).
This unfortunate
decision died aborning. The timing was poor. See text at note 29 supra.
63. 101 Ill. 206 (1882).
64. Id. at 217-18.
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power to loan money, any foreign corporation which then had
the power to loan money would have been of the same character,
and therefore would not have had any greater powers than such
Illinois corporations organized under the General Corporation
Act of 1872.65 The court concluded that the passage of the 1875
lending statute was merely a continuation and expression of the
public policy of the state to permit foreign corporations to lend
money in Illinois.6"
67
In Marks v. Chicago Mortgage Corp. the same argument
was renewed. It was stated that no foreign corporation could
be authorized to transact any business in Illinois which a domestic corporation could not be organized to transact. Since the 1872
General Incorporation Act expressly excluded Illinois corporations being organized for the business of loaning money, it was
contended that foreign corporations could not loan money in Illinois. The court refused to read the language of the 1872 statute
in such a limited way. The First District Appellate Court stated:

The language has a broader scope. It excludes only those foreign corporations which undertake to transact a business in this
state which cannot be incorporated under any of the laws of
this State. Corporations formed for the business of loaning
money are not unlawful, but are provided for under a number
of statutes such as the statutes relating to Banks, Building Loan
and Homestead Associations, Pawners' Societies and Wage Loan
Corporations. 8
The Marks case is consistent with the Stevens case in giving a
broad interpretation to the lending statute.
9
American Guaranty Co. v. State Bank of East Lynn
involved a reading of the qualification provision contained in the
General Corporation Act of 1919 together with its penalties. The
statute at that time applied to foreign corporations except bank70
The
ing, insurance, building and loan and surety companies.
exceptions were inserted, the court said, because the power to
issue permits to engage in these businesses was vested in departments other than the Secretary of State, the department which
65. Id. at 225-29. The court lists eight Illinois corporations which
were incorporated under special acts of the legislature and possessed the
power to loan money. Id. at 225-27.
66. Id. at 229.
67. 218 Ill. App. 1 (1st Dist. 1920).
68. Id. at 4-5.
69. 244 Ill. App. 16 (3d Dist. 1927).
70. Act of June 28, 1919, ch. 32, § 80, [1919] Ill. Laws 316, 334, (now
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.102 (1973)), ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 80 (Hurd
1919). The current exclusions are foreign corporations acting as
trustee, executor, administrator, administrator to collect, guardian,
conservator, or in any other like fiduciary capacity in this State or
to transact in this State the business of banking, insurance, suretyship, or a business of the character of a building and loan corporation.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.102 (1973).

308 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 9:295

issued general licenses to business corporations to do business
under the qualification statute. 7 1 In effect, the court held that
the penalties imposed on foreign corporations by the General
'Corporation Act of 1919 for failure to qualify should not be
applied to all corporations, since this would place unreasonable
burdens on certain corporations, such as foreign insurance companies, which would have to obtain licenses under "two separate,
independent and executive departments of government for regulation. ''72 Thus, aside from the lending statute, the court set
forth an independent basis for sustaining the enforceability of
a loan made by a foreign corporation which had been organized
for one of the excepted purposes and was not subject to penalties for failure to qualify.
Other Illinois cases cite the lending statute, but none are
helpful in analyzing or understanding

73
it.

It seems clear, there-

fore, that case law does not serve to solve the problem of
whether lending money in Illinois is transacting business. Nonetheless, while none of the cases discussed above directly address
the issue, all favor an expansive reading of the lending provision.
The next section of this article will focus, therefore, on a textual
study of the statute itself and an examination of the 1953 amendment. Inquiry into the statute, as amended, partially answers
the question of whether lending money in Illinois is transacting
business. The 1953 amendment provided that a foreign corporation will not be deemed to be transacting business by reason of
the activities enumerated in the statute.74 However, the question is shrouded in grave doubt since the breadth of those protected activities was made uncertain by the restrictive nature
of the amendatory language.
THE 1953 AMENDMENT

On March 17, 1953, Illinois Representatives Arrington and
Sullivan introduced in the sixty-eighth session of the General
71. Am. Guar. Co. v. State Bank of E. Lynn, 244 Ill. App. 16 (3d Dist.
1927).
72. Id.

73. See W. Side R.R. v. Pittsburgh Constr. Co., 219 U.S. 92, 103
(1911); Gross v. United States Mortgage Co., 108 U.S. 466, 479-80 (1882)
(lending act of 1875 not inconsistent with fourteenth amendment); Met-

ropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Whitestone Management Co., 77 F.2d 255, 259
(7th Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 632 (1935), reh. denied, 296 U.S.
664 (1935) (held that a certificate giving an insurance company authority

to carry on a life insurance business inferentially confers a power to
make investments, including investments in local mortgages); Fidelity
Inv. Ass'n v. Emmerson, 318 Ill. 548, 149 N.E. 530 (1925); Richardson
v. U.S. Mortgage Co., 194 Ill. 259, 62 N.E. 606 (1902); Metropolitan Life

Ins. Co. v. Kobbeman, 260 Ill. App. 508 (2d Dist. 1931).
74. See lines 49-51 of House Bill 410 in text at note 76 infra.
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Assembly House Bill 410, 75 which proposed an amendment to
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 212. The following portions of the bill
76
will aid in a textual study of the amendment.
A BILL

For an Act to amend Section 1 of "An Act to enable corporations in other states and countries to lend money in Illinois, to
enforce their securities and acquire title to real estate as security," approved May 24, 1897.
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly:
Section 1. Section 1 of "An Act to
enable corporations in other states and
2 countries to lend money in Illinois, to
enforce their securities and acquire title
3 to real estate as security", approved May
4

5
6
7

24, 1897, is amended to read as follows:

Sec. 1. [That] Any Corporation formed
under the laws of any other state
or country, and authorized by its charter
to invest and loan money, may [invest
or loan money in this state.], without

qualifying to transact business in this
state, purchase or contract to purchase
and acquire notes or other evidences of
9 indebtedness or interests therein, secured
by any security instrument, including
10 mortgages or trust deeds in the nature of
mortgages conveying real or personal
11 property in the State of Illinois. [And
any such] Notwithstanding the provi12 sions of any other law of this state,
8

13

any foreign corporation that may have heretofore or hereafter [invested or lent money]

acquired notes or other evidences
14

of indebtedness as aforesaid, [may] shall
have the same rights and powers for

75. Ill. H. Jour., 68th Gen. Assembly, 1953 Sess., vol. I at 251.
76. The original language of the 1897 lending statute which the 1953
House Bill omitted is indicated in the text by being enclosed in brackets
and by being underlined. The new language, proposed by the Illinois
Representatives, is italicized in the text. Lines 25 thru 45 are not included in the text above since they are not relevant to the discussion
in the article. This section of the bill eliminated the provisions in the
1897 law for a public auction of any real estate purchased by a foreign
corporation, but retained the requirement that the foreign corporation
must dispose of any such real estate within five years after acquiring
title pursuant to the statute.
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15
16
17
18
19
20
21

the recovery, servicing, protection and
enforcement, by foreclosure or otherwise,
of such notes or other evidences of indebtedness [thereof] subject to the same
penalties for usury, as private persons,
citizens of this state [;]. Such foreign
corporation shall have power to acquire,
hold, lease, mortgage, sell, contract
with respect to, or otherwise protect or
convey property in this state heretofore
or hereafter assigned, transferred, mortgaged or conveyed to it as security for,
or in whole or part satisfaction of, indebtedness acquired or owned by it. [and]

22

When a sale is made under any judgment,
decree or power in a mortgage or
23 deed, such foreign corporation may purchase,
in its corporate name, the prop24 erty offered for sale, and become vested
with the title wherever a natural person
25 might do so in like cases: ....
[: And,] "Corpora46 tion" as used in this act shall be deemed
to include any bank or insurance com47 pany, provided [further], that nothing
in this act contained shall be so construed
48 as to confer banking powers or privileges
upon any such corporation.
49
No foreign corporation shall be deemed
to be transacting business in this
50 state solely by reason of the performance
of any of the acts hereinabove author51 ized.
After being passed by the House, 7 7 the bill was sent to the
Senate which concurred in its passage along with the following
amendments:
AMENDMENT NO. 1

2
3
4
5
6

Amend House Bill No. 410 in Senate on
Page 1, Section 1, Line 8, by striking the words "and acquire" and
on Page 2, Section 1, Line 13 by striking
the word "acquired" and substituting
in lieu thereof the word "purchased" and
on Page 2, Section 1, Line 21, by striking
the word "acquired" and substituting
78
in lieu thereof the word "purchased".

77. Ill. H. Jour., 68th Gen. Assembly, 1953 Sess., vol. I at 724.
78. Ill. S. Jour., 68th Gen. Assembly, 1953 Sess., vol. II at 1534.
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The bill was sent back to the House which concurred with the
Senate in adopting the amendment.7 1 It was approved July 15,
1953.0
It was the erroneous feeling of some commentators that the
amended bill marked a considerable enlargement in the powers
granted to unlicensed foreign corporations. It was argued that
the bill allowed both the lending of money on notes or other
evidences of indebtedness as well as the taking of security interests in real property within the state without becoming liable
for those consequences normally attendant upon the transaction
of unlicensed business within the state. 8 ' In a like manner the
Illinois Attorney General interpreted the amendment as a grant
of rights and powers to foreign corporations . 2 It is suggested
that both of the above interpretations are incorrect.
Too often in construing a statute, the last place one looks
is at the language of the statute itself. This should be the starting point. 83 Since there is virtually no legislative history available regarding the amendment, there is no opportunity to resort
to such sources for its meaning. 4 Therefore, the language of
the statute itself must be examined and analyzed. Finally, a
comparison will be made between our analysis and the Attorney
General's Opinion. ',
79. Ill. H. Jour., 68th Gen. Assembly, 1953 Sess., vol. II at 1937.
80. Laws of Ill. 1508 (1953).
81. Survey of Illinois Law for the Year 1952-1953, 32 CHi.-KENT L.

REv. 1, 4 (1953).

82. ILL. Anr'Y GEN. Op. 18 (1959). The opinion expressly concedes
that "separate and apart from paragraph 212, a foreign corporation may
loan money in Illinois, take back security, and foreclose the same, without being compelled to qualify to do business in Illinois." Id. at 20. It

correctly analyzes the lending statute as one designed to grant powers,

not to restrict them.
clusive expression.

It also emphasizes the word "any" as being an in-

83. F. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. Rm. 527, 535 (1947).
84. The Illinois State Library in Springfield, where the records of the
68th General Assembly are kept, could find no committee reports or floor
debates, since they were rarely recorded at that time except for very
newsworthy or unusual bills.
85. ILL. ATT'Y' GEN. OP. 18 (1959). Besides analyzing the changes

in the language of the statute itself, the Attorney General argued that,
apart from the statute, the existing state of the law at the time of the
amendment was that a foreign corporation was not doing business by
lending money to an Illinois resident, if the loan was completed outside
of the state. Id. at 20. The case that he cited, Indus. Acceptance Corp.
v. Haering, 253 Ill. App. 97 (3d Dist. 1929) is discussed in the text at
note 147 infra. Thus, even if the statute was intended to be restrictive,
there is authority in Illinois that a foreign corporation may loan money
in the state and take back security without qualifying or being penalized.
See discussion in the text under heading "The Insulation Method" infra.
The opinion, of course is unsatisfactory. It simply evades the key question by pointing out the obvious, namely, that under the insulation
theory a loan consummated outside of Illinois does not become an Illinois transaction for the simple reason that Illinois land is included as
part of the security. See text at note 140 infra. Surely no Attorney Gen-
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The major change brought about by the amendment was to
delete the words "invest or loan money in this state," and to
substitute the words "without qualifying to transact business in
this state, purchase or contract to purchase notes or other evidences of indebtedness or interests therein." The general rule
of statutory construction, according to Sutherland, is that when
an amendatory act purports to set out the original act as amended, all matter from the original act that is omitted in the amendment is considered repealed. The new statute thereby becomes
a substitute for the original, and only those provisions of the
original repeated in the amendment are retained.8 6 If this rule
is applied, it appears that the General Assembly intended to
repeal provisions for investing and lending money in Illinois and
intended to substitute a narrower activity, that of purchasing
existing loans.
However, there is an ambiguity involved since the legislature
failed to amend the title. It still reads, "An Act to amend Section 1 of 'An Act to enable foreign corporations in other states
and countries to lend money in Illinois, to enforce their securities and acquire title to real estate as security', approved May
24, 1897. ''s1 It should be noted that the general rule cited above
from Sutherland is merely one for determining the intent of the
legislature. The rule is not absolute and must yield when a contrary intent of the legislature is indicated."" This contrary
intention may be shown
by a consideration of the amendatory act in its entirety, or by
a consideration of the amendatory act and the unamended sections of the original act or bill as a whole, or by contemporaneous legislation on the same subject or by other circumstances
surrounding the enactment of the amendment.8 9

The Attorney General compared the amendatory language
with the unamended sections of the 1897 statute. He pointed
out that the title of the act remained the same, and that the act
continued "to enable foreign corporations in other states and
countries to lend money in Illinois.""" However, it is difficult
to understand why a careful draftsman would deliberately delete
eral's opinion is needed to draw attention to such an elementary proposition. What the Attorney General refused to face up to is the effect of
Illinois law on an Illinois mortgage loan that was not protected by the
insulation theory.
86. 1A SUTHERLAND § 22.32. Sutherland points out: "The intent of
the legislature to set out the original act or section as amended is most
commonly indicated by a statement in the amendatory act that the original law is amended to read as follows." Id. That is precisely the language used in the 1953 amendment.
87. Laws of Ill. 1508 [1953]. See discussion in text at note 105 infra.
88. 1A SUTHERLAND § 22.32.
89. Id.
90. ILL. ATT'Y GEN. OP. 18, 21 (1959).
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the words "invest or loan money" from the body of the act and
intentionally retain them in the title for the purpose of indicating
that the statute still pertained to these activities. The more
obvious and clearer method to indicate this would have been to
retain the language in the body of the act. If it is conceded
that the draftsman intentionally left the title unchanged, it
would seem that the only possible reason would be to camouflage the restrictive language in the body of the act.91
The Attorney General interpreted the insertion of the provisions "to purchase or contract to purchase notes or other evidences of indebtedness" as a clarification of the powers of a
foreign corporation not only to make direct loans, but also to
purchase existing loans. He reasoned that since the language of
the 1897 law may have misled one to believe that only direct
loans were authorized under the statute, 92 the expansive amendatory language could be viewed as clarifying language. However, there was no conflict about the language in the Illinois
cases, and purchasing notes was never mentioned in any Illinois
Attorney General Opinion. 9 3 Certainly, the word "invest," as
91. Although the 1870 Constitution, ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1870),
provided that bills be read aloud in their entirety on three different
days in each house, this procedure was not followed, since it was obviously impractical and too time-consuming to read every bill six times
before passage. Instead the bills were read by title only on three different occasions in both houses, and fraudulently the journals of the
House and Senate indicated that the constitutional requirement was fulfilled. See ILL. COMM'N ON THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, REPORT ON IMPROVING THE STATE LEGISLATURE ch. 1, at 12-13 (1967); A. ELSON, CONSTITuTIONAL REVISION AND REORGANIZATION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 33 ILL.
L. REV. 15, 26 (1938).
The amendatory act was passed by the Senate
on June 17, 1953, and by the House on June 22, 1953, at a time when
the bulk of the legislation was passed. This phenomenon of the enormous work load in the last few weeks of each legislative session has
been referred to as the "log jam." See ILL. COMM'N ON THE ORGANIZATION

OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

REPORT ON IMPROVING THE STATE LFis-

ch. 2, at 23 (1967). In light of these practices, the temptation
must have been great to camouflage a bill by using a misleading title.
LATURE

If the amendment in question is read as a restriction, it would be a great

benefit to Illinois banks and lending corporations, since the foreign corporation would be compelled to buy Illinois investments from them.
This would protect the Illinois banks and corporations from competition
and give them more business. See also IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-1-11-1.5
(Burns Supp. 1974) (statute very similar in wording to the Illinois lending statute, clearly indicating an intent to protect Indiana lending and
investing institutions).
92. ILL. ATT'Y GEN. OP. 18, 22 (1959).
93. See discussion in text of Illinois cases under heading "Illinois
Cases" supra. The only Illinois Attorney General Opinion prior to the
1953 amendment which mentioned the statute is ILL. ATr'Y GEN. OP. 91
(1951). One other opinion, ILL. ATT'Y GEN. OP. 323 (1940), overlooked the
lending statute even though it referred to two cases which cite the statute (Stevens v. Pratt, 101 Ill. 206 (1882) and Marks v. Chicago Mortgage
Corp., 218 Ill. App. 1 (1st Dist. 1920)). Neither of these opinions even
mentioned purchasing existing loans. Two Illinois Appellate Court cases
involved notes that were purchased by a foreign corporation. While
Indus. Acceptance Corp. v. Haering, 253 Ill. App. 97 (3d Dist. 1929) did
not mention the lending statute, Metropolitan Life Ins. v. Kobbeman, 260
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it appeared in the 1897 law, meant more than merely making
direct loans. The word has a broader meaning, which is "to
commit [money] for a long period in order to earn a financial
return. '94 Purchasing notes is merely one way to invest money.
Lending money is another. Even conceding that the insertion
may have clarified this point, the deletion of words "invest or
loan money" added more confusion than clarification to the statute as a whole.
The Attorney General also believed that the amendment, by
adding the words "secured by any security instrument," clarified
the fact that "the corporation could take back security, as a mortgage, trust deed, conditional sale contract or other security
instrument, without being deemed to be transacting business in
Illinois." 95 It was already clear from the title of the 1897 statute, that foreign corporations were enabled to enforce their
securities and acquire title to real estate as security."" While
the body of the statute did not specifically mention security, it
did provide that the foreign corporation could purchase property
offered for sale under a "judgment, decree or power in a mortgage or deed. '9 7 These words clearly contemplated such securities as a mortgage and a trust deed. Thus there was no need
for legislative clarification. Also, even conceding that the additional language did clarify the statute, applying well established
rules of grammar, the adjectival clause, "secured by any security
instrument," must be read together with the noun it modifies,
"notes or other evidences of indebtedness." Thus, secured by any
security instrument refers only to purchased loans, not to direct
loans.
Another provision which the Attorney General felt clarified
matters not covered by the 1897 statute was the one providing
for "servicing, protection and enforcement, by foreclosure or
otherwise."98 This quotation from the statute by the Attorney
General, however, should have included the phrase immediately
following it, "of such notes or other evidences of indebtedness."9 9 These rights and powers of servicing, protection, and
Ill. App. 508 (2d Dist. 1931) did cite the statute. However, these cases
do not seem to be in conflict, since both cases recognized the power of

a foreign corporation to purchase notes which were obligations of Illinois

residents.

94. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1189 (G. & C.
Merriam Co. 1971).
95. ILL. ATr'Y GEN. OP. 18, 22 (1959).
96. Act of May 24, 1897, ch. 32, § 67a, [1897] Ill. Laws 176 (now ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 212 (1973)), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 67a (Hurd 1897).
97. Id.
98. ILL. ATT'Y GEN. OP. 18, 22 (1959).
99. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 212 (1973).
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enforcement clearly pertain only to purchased notes, not to direct
loans.
Other indications of legislative intent are the amendments
which were made in either house.' 00 As pointed out above, the
Senate amended the bill to eliminate the words "and acquire"
from line 8 in the phrase "purchase or contract to purchase
[and acquire] notes." 10 1 The Senate also changed the word
"acquired" in lines 13 and 21 to read "purchased." This was
done in the section which granted the rights to service, protect,
and enforce the "[acquired] purchased notes," and the section
which granted a corporation the power to
acquire, hold, lease, mortgage, sell, contract with respect to, or
otherwise protect or convey property heretofore or hereafter
assigned, transferred, mortgaged or conveyed to it as security
for ...indebtedness [acquired] purchased or owned by it.102
Why was the Senate so concerned about the word acquired?
One possible explanation is that "acquire" is a broad word.
Acquire is defined as "to come into possession, control, or power
10 3
of disposal of often by some uncertain or unspecified means.' 1
Presumably this would include a direct loan. On the other
hand, "purchase" has a narrower meaning. It is defined as, "to
obtain by paying money or its equivalent."' 0 4 It is clear that
"acquire," the more general term, includes coming into possession of notes by any means, that is, by purchase, gift, inheritance, theft, direct loan, or any other means. But purchasing notes only includes paying money to obtain them. By
eliminating the words "and acquire" from the first section and
by retaining the word "purchase," the Senate exhibited an intention to have the statute pertain to a much narrower activity.
This is also shown by the substitution of "purchased" for
"acquired" in the sections enumerating the powers of foreign
corporations.
Thus by examining the words used to amend the House Bill
itself, the logical conclusion is that the Sixty-Eighth General
Assembly intended to restrict the scope of the statute. If so,
the courts of Illinois may decide to interpret the 1953 amendment
as a restriction on the rights and powers of foreign corporations.
If that occurs, there are two areas upon which foreign corporations may rely for relief from the effects of the amendment:
the statute's unconstitutionality and the insulation method of
lending money.
100. 2A SUTHERLAND § 48.18.
101. See text at note 78 supra.
102. Id.
103. WEBsTn's THMD NEW INTERNATIONAL
Merriam Co. 1971).
104. Id.
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Constitutional Problems

As pointed out in the previous section, the General Assembly
changed the scope of the text of the lending statute without making the appropriate indication in the title. Thus, while the title
reads, "An Act to amend Section 1 of 'An Act to enable corporations in other states and countries to lend money in Illinois, to
enforce their securities and acquire title to real estate as security',
approved May 24, 1897," the statute itself only pertains to purchasing or contracting to purchase notes. 10 5 This was undoubtedly misleading both to the public and to overworked legislators,
many of whom may not have had the time to read the bill
carefully.1 0 6
The 1870 Constitution, which was in force at the time of the
1953 amendment, contained a provision concerning legislative
titles. It provided that: "No act hereafter passed shall embrace
more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the
title."' 0 7 While many courts fail to make the distinction, there
are actually two rules combined in that provision. Each has an
independent origin and purpose. 08
The first prohibits any act
from containing more than one subject. The purpose of this is
to prevent the abuses of log-rolling and to eliminate the attachment of "riders" to popular legislation certain to be enacted. 10 9
The other rule contained in the constitutional provision is
that the title must contain an expression of the subject matter
of the act. 110 It is intended to give notice to the legislature
and the people as to the contents of the act. 1 ' The Illinois
Supreme Court in People ex rel. Stuckart v. Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R. 2 explained this in detail, stating that the purpose of the
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 212 (1973).
106. See note 91 supra.
107. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 (1870).
108. See 1A SUTHERLAND §§ 17.01, 18.01; Comment, State Statutes: The
One-Subject Rule Under the 1970 Constitution, 6 J. MAR. J. 359 (1973).
109. 1A SUTHERLAND § 17.01; Comment, State Statutes: The OneSubject Rule Under the 1970 Constitution, 6 J.. Mar. J. 359 (1973). This
rule was retained in the 1970 Constitution. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 8(d):
"Bills, except bills for appropriations and for the codification, revision
or rearrangement of laws, shall be confined to one subject."
110. 1A SUTHERLAND § 18.02; Comment, State Statutes: The OneSubject Rule Under the 1970 Constitution, 6 J. MAR. J. 359, 361-66 (1973).
This provision was eliminated by the 1970 Constitution. For an excellent discussion, background, and criticism of the elimination of the title
rule see Comment, State Statutes: The One-Subject Rule Under the
1970 Constitution, 6 J. MAR. J. 359, 372-75 (1973).
111. People ex. rel. Stuckart v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 290 Ill. 327, 33233, 125 N.E. 310, 313 (1919); Rouse v. Thompson, 228 Ill. 522, 528-29, 81
N.E. 1109, 1111 (1907); 1A SUTHERLAND § 18.02; Comment, State Statutes: The One-Subject Rule Under the 1970 Constitution, 6 J. MAR. J.
359, 361-62 (1973). T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 173 (5th ed. 1883).
112. 290 Ill. 327, 125 N.E. 310 (1919).
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rule is to inform and fully apprise the people of the subject
matter of the legislation so that they might be heard thereon,
if they so desire, by petition or remonstrance. It also prevents
surprise or fraud upon the legislature. It prevents the insertion
of provisions into the bill which are not indicated by the title,
and thereby prevents a bill from being unintentionally
adopted.1 13 As a result of a violation of the title rule, the 1953
amendment may have been unintentionally adopted by legislators who were not given notice of the change in the body of
the act.
Although the 1970 Illinois Constitution retained the provi4
sion on unity of subject matter, the title rule was deleted."
However, an act which was passed prior to July 1, 1971, while
the 1870 Constitution was in effect, must still be judged by the
1870 Constitution, and must meet the title requirements under
that constitution. 1 5 Thus, the 1953 amendment which was
passed under the 1870 Constitution must meet the title requirements.
The title rule was not meant to make the task of the
draftsman an impossibility." 6 "Any expression in the title
that calls attention to the subject of the act, although in general
terms

is

all that is

required."' 1

7

It

has

often

been

said

that the General Assembly must determine for itself how broad
and comprehensive the object of the subject of the act shall be
and how much particularity shall be employed in the title." 8
It is a matter of discretion of the legislature to make the title
either general or particular." 9 If the General Assembly
113. Id. at 332, 125 N.E. at 313.
114. See notes 109-10 supra.
115. People v. Tibbitts, 56 Ill. 2d 56, 64, 305 N.E.2d 152, 157 (1973);
Dee-El Garage, Inc. v. Korzen, 53 Ill. 2d 1, 5, 289 N.E.2d 431, 434 (1972);
Comment, State Statutes: The One-Subject Rule Under the 1970 Constitution, 6 J. MAR. J. 359, 361 n. 14 (1973); cf. People ex rel. Cairo & St.
Louis R.R. v. Trustees of Schools, 78 Ill. 136, 140 (1875) (act passed while
1848 Constitution was in effect tested by 1848 Constitution even though
that Constitution had since been replaced by 1872 Constitution). See
also People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Caliendo, 50 Ill. 2d 72, 277 N.E.2d 319
(1971) (semble); Comment, Cumulative Voting Under the Illinois Constitution, 8 J. MAR. J. 327, 341 n. 73 (1974).
116. 1A SUTHELAND § 18.02.
117. People ex rel. Stuckart v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 290 Ill 327, 332,
125 N.E. 310, 313 (1919).
118. People v. Tibbitts, 56 Ill. 2d 56, 64, 305 N.E.2d 152, 157 (1973);
Dee-El Garage, Inc. v. Korzen, 53 Ill. 2d 1, 9, 289 N.E.2d 431, 436 (1972);
People ex rel. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. Schlaeger, 391 Ill. 314, 326,
63 N.E.2d 382, 389 (1945); Stolze Lumber Co. v. Stratton, 386 Ill. 334,
341, 54 N.E.2d 554, 557 (1944); People ex rel. Gage v. Village of Wilmette,
375 Ill. 420, 422, 31 N.E.2d 774, 775 (1941); People ex rel. Stuckart v.
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R., 290 Ill. 327, 334, 125 N.E. 310, 313 (1919); Sutter
v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 284 Ill. 634, 642, 120 N.E. 562, 566
(1918); Rouse v. Thompson, 228 Ill. 522, 533, 81 N.E. 1109, 1112 (1907);
People ex rel. Longenecker v. Nelson, 133 Ill. 565, 575, 27 N.E. 217, 218
(1890); 1A SUTHERLAND § 17.02.
119. See note 118 supra.
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chooses a general title, it may incorporate as many provisions
in the act as it deems necessary. The provisions may be diverse
as long as they are not inconsistent or unrelated to the general
120
title to the act.
In considering whether all provisions of an amendatory act
are embraced within the subject of the title, courts frequently
use the word "germane" as a test. 121 This term was defined
1 22
by the Illinois Supreme Court in Dolese v. Pierce.
Literally, "germane" means "akin," "closely allied." It is only
applicable to persons who are united to each other by the common tie of blood or marriage. When applied to inanimate
things, it is, of course, used in a metaphorical sense, but still
the idea of a common tie is always present. Thus when properly applied to a legislative provision, the common tie is found
in the tendency of the provision to promote the object and purpose of the act to which it belongs. Any provision not having
this tendency, which introduces new subject matter into the act,
is clearly obnoxious to the constitutional provision in question.
It is an error to suppose that two things are, in a legal sense,
germane to each other merely because there is a resemblance
between them, or because they have some characteristics common to them both. One might with just as much reason, contend that two persons are necessarily akin because they are of
123
the same complexion, or in other particulars alike.
This case applied the test of germaneness to amendatory
language in a statute and found that since the language introduced new substantive matter which was not expressed in the
title, the act was void and unconstitutional. 24 Applying this
120. Stolze Lumber Co. v. Stratton, 386 Ill. 334, 341, 54 N.E.2d 554,
557 (1944); People ex rel. Gage v. Village of Wilmette, 375 Ill. 420, 422,
31 N.E.2d 774, 775 (1941); People ex rel. Stuckart v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.,
290 Ill. 327, 333, 125 N.E. 310, 313 (1919); Sutter v. People's Gas Light
& Coke Co., 284 Ill. 634, 642, 120 N.E. 562, 566 (1918); Rouse v. Thompson,
228 Ill. 522, 533, 81 N.E. 1107, 1112 (1907). For an example of an
amended act of this type which was held to be valid see People v. Lloyd,
304 Ill. 23, 136 N.E. 505 (1922). The title of the act was "An Act to
revise the laws in relation to criminal jurisprudence." An amendment
adding six sections was held to be within the scope of the title.
121. See, e.g., Dee-El Garage, Inc. v. Korzen, 53 Ill. 2d 1, 9, 289 N.E.2d
431, 435-36 (1972); I.B.M. Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 25 Ill. 2d 503, 507,
185 N.E.2d 257, 260 (1962); People ex rel. Stuckart v. Chicago, B. & Q.
R.R., 290 Ill. 327, 333-34, 125 N.E. 310, 313 (1919).
122. 124 Ill. 140, 16 N.E. 218 (1888).
123. Id. at 147, 16 N.E. at 220. This definition is quoted by People
ex rel. Stuckart v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R., 290 Ill. 327, 334, 125 N.E. 310,
313 (1919); and Sutter v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 284 Ill. 634,
643, 120 N.E.562, 566 (1918).
124. Dolese v. Pierce, 124 Ill. 140, 146, 16 N.E. 218, 219 (1888). The
title of the act in question was "An act to amend sections 2, 4, 6, 7, 10,
11, and 12 of art. 3 of an act entitled 'An act to revise the law in relation to township organizations', approved and in force March 4, 1874."
Commenting on the title, the court pointed out:
It is difficult to conceive of a title that more effectually concealed
the real object and purpose of an act than the present one does. The
constitution forbids and condemns all such devices. Whether intended to be so or not, they are frauds upon the legislature and the
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test, the amendatory language of the 1953 Act introduced new
substantive matter into the Act: purchasing notes. The new
language did not promote the object and purpose of the Act as
expressed in the title. According to the title, the object and purpose of the Act is to enable foreign corporations to loan money
in Illinois. While there is a resemblance between lending money
and purchasing notes, they are neither the same nor akin.
The legislature may choose to restrict the title of an act so
that it covers only a particular branch of a general subject. If
so, provisions not within that particular branch, though germane
to the general subject, cannot be sustained as being within the
scope of the title. 1 25 This rule was also expressed in People
12
ex rel. Stuckart v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. 0
The court cannot enlarge the scope of the title or uphold
provisions not within that particular branch even though
subjects are germane and are departments or branches of a
gle subject, so that they might have been included
under
127
title if such title had been made broad enough.

the
the
sinone

The titles of the 1897 and 1953 lending statutes provide for
enabling a foreign corporation "to lend money in Illinois." This
is a particular branch of a general subject which could be called
investment. Investment is a more generic term. Earlier in this
article "to invest" was defined as "to commit [money] for a long
period in order to earn a financial return.' 1 28 If used in the title,
the word "invest" would have been broad enough to include both
direct lending and purchasing notes. However, the legislature
did not use "invest." They used the word "to lend," which is
defined as, "to let out [money] for temporary use on condition
that it be repaid with interest at an agreed time. ' 129 The word
people of the State (emphasis added).
Id. at 149, 16 N.E. at 221.
125. People v. Tibbitts, 56 Ill. 2d 56, 64, 305 N.E.2d 152, 157 (1973);
Dee-El Garage, Inc. v. Korzen, 53 Ill. 2d 1, 9, 289 N.E.2d 431, 436 (1972);
Stolze Lumber Co. v. Stratton, 386 Ill. 334, 341, 54 N.E.2d 554, 557
(1944); People ex rel. Gage v. Village of Wilmette, 375 Ill. 420, 423, 31
N.E.2d 774, 775 (1941); People ex rel. Stuckart v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.,
290 Ill. 327, 334-35, 125 N.E. 310, 313 (1919); Sutter v. People's Gas Light
& Coke Co., 284 Ill. 634, 644, 120 N.E. 562, 566 (1918); Rouse v. Thompson, 228 Ill. 522, 531-33, 81 N.E. 1109, 1112 (1907); ILL. ATT'y GEN. OP.
120, at 123 (1957); 1A SUTHERLAND § 17.02.
126. 290 Ill. 327, 125 N.E. 310 (1919).
127. Id. at 334, 125 N.E. at 313. The title of the act in this case was
"An Act to authorize the corporate authorities of towns to issue bonds
for the completion and improvement of public parks and boulevards, and
to provide a tax for the payment of same." Since the title specified that
the tax was to be raised to pay bonds and interest, a provision in the
act for levying a tax for maintaining and managing the parks and boulevards was not within the title and was declared void. The fact that the
objection was raised more than twenty years after the act was passed
was held not to be sufficient to invoke the doctrine of estoppel.
128. See text at note 94 supra.
129. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1293 (G. & C.
Merriam Co. 1971).
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"purchase" was defined earlier as, "to obtain by paying money
or its equivalent."' 130 Lending money and purchasing notes are
two specific branches of the general subject of investment.
Even though the two have common characteristics, purchasing
notes is not within the scope of the title "to lend money." The
amended provisions are not germane to the subject as expressed
in the title.
One other standard which occasionally has been used by the
courts to test the sufficiency of titles is the reasonable man standard. It asks whether "the ordinary mind" reading the title of
the act would conceive of a certain provision as being included
in the act.13 ' It is here contended that if the title of the 1953 Act
is read, the ordinary mind would not conceive from its language
("to lend money") that a provision would follow enabling foreign
corporations merely to purchase loans.
While there appears to be no Illinois case discussing the distinction between lending money and purchasing notes, the
Oregon Supreme Court considered this in General Electric Corp.
v. State Tax Comm.1 3 2 It held that a corporation whose principal
business was purchasing conditional sales contracts from retail
merchants was not engaged in "lending money" within the meaning of a state excise tax statute. 1 3 3 The court noted that the purchase of conditional sales contracts is not a loan of money in an
ordinary or legal understanding.1 3 4
It found that a sale of a
chose in action does not involve a loan of money within the
meaning of the usury law."35
Amendatory Acts and the Title Rule
The Illinois Supreme Court has applied the title and subject
provisions specifically to amendatory acts. When the title of the
original act is repeated in the title of the amendatory act, anything may be included in the amendatory act that is embraced
within the title of the original act."36 The court has upheld
amendatory acts when the title was also amended to increase
130. See text at note 104 supra.
131. See, e.g., People v. Mahumed, 381 Ill. 81, 84-85, 44 N.E.2d 911,
912 (1942) (the "ordinary mind"); Rouse v. Thompson, 228 Ill. 522, 529,
81 N.E. 1109, 1111 (1907) (the "ordinary mind").
132. 231 Or. 570, 373 P.2d 974 (1962).
133. Id. at 590, 373 P.2d at 983.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 591, 373 P.2d at 983.
136. I.B.M. Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 25 Ill. 2d 503, 507, 185 N.E.2d
257, 260 (1962); People ex rel. Bentson v. Bowen, 9 Ill. 2d 69, 73, 136
N.E'2d 806 (1956); Malloy v. City of Chicago, 369 Ill. 97, 101, 15 N.E.2d
861, 864 (1938); City of Evanston v. Wazau, 364 Ill. 198, 203, 4 N.E.2d
78, 80 (1936); People v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 355 Ill. 244, 249, 189 N.E. 26,
28 (1934); Gage v. City of Chicago, 203 Ill. 26, 28-29, 67 N.E. 477, 478

(1903); IA
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the scope of the title.'1 7 However, the court has generally held
that amendatory provisions which are not germane to the subject expressed in the title of the original act are unconstitutional
3 s
when the title of the act has not been amended.'1
The amendatory Act of 1953 merely repeated the title of the
Act of 1897. Applying the rules above, any provision could have
been included in the 1953 amendatory Act which could have been
embraced in the title of the original 1897 lending statute. Since
purchasing notes is not germane to lending money, the amendment attempting to change the scope of the subject matter
expressed in the title, without changing the title, is unconstitutional.
To recapitulate, then, the purpose of the 1953 amendment,
so framed that it misled both the Illinois Atttorney General
and a legal periodical commentator, was, it is evident, to strip
foreign corporate lenders of their power to make direct loans in
Illinois without qualifying to do business in Illinois. This would
force them to purchase such investments from local lenders, who
it was clear, would receive compensation for their role. However,
the action was taken ineptly. The title of the statute was
left unaltered. This failure to amend the title, it is clear,
invalidated the amendment.
The effect of enacting an invalid amendment to a statute
is to leave the law in force as it was prior to the adoption of
the amendment. ' 9 If the 1953 amendment is found to be
unconstitutional, the 1897 statute would be in effect, enabling
foreign corporations to lend money in Illinois without having to
qualify and without being penalized by being denied access to
the state courts.
No one can predict with certainty what the Illinois Supreme
Court will decide if presented with this statutory problem. However, if the court upholds the constitutionality of the amendatory
Act, there are two other possible constructions which the court
may adopt. First, it could agree with the Attorney General's
137. See, e.g., Zisook v. Maryland-Drexel Neighborhood Redev. Corp.,
3 Ill. 2d 570, 121 N.E.2d 804 (1954); People ex rel. Gutknecht v. City
of Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953).
138. Dee-El Garage, Inc. v. Korzen, 53 Ill. 2d 1, 8, 289 N.E.2d 431, 435
(1972); I.B.M. Corp. v. Dep't of Revenue, 25 Ill. 2d 503, 507, 185 N.E.2d
257, 260 (1962); see also Johnson v. Daley, 403 Ill. 338, 86 N.E.2d 350

(1949); Stolze Lumber Co. v. Stratton, 386 Ill. 334, 54 N.E.2d 554 (1944);

Sutter v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 284 Ill. 634, 120 N.E. 562 (1918);
1A SUTHERLAND § 22.08.
139. Dee-El Garage, Inc. v. Korzen, 53 Ill. 2d 1, 11, 289 N.E.2d 431,
436 (1972); Van Driel Drug Store, Inc. v. Mahin, 47 Ill. 2d 378, 381, 265
N.E.2d 659, 661 (1970); Fiorito v. Jones, 39 Ill. 2d 531, 541, 236 N.E.2d
698, 704-05 (1968); People ex rel. Barrett v. Sbarbaro, 386 Ill. 581, 590,
54 N.E.2d 559. 562 (1944); People v. Schraeberg, 347 Ill. 392, 394, 179

N.E. 829, 830 (1932).
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Opinion that the 1953 amendment did not restrict the scope of
the statute, but rather, the change clarified and granted rights
to foreign corporations. If this interpretation is found to be
correct (an unlikely result) there will be no constitutional problem and no problem for the foreign corporation. But if the court
agrees that the purpose of the amendment was to restrict the
powers of foreign corporations, and does not find the amendment
to be unconstitutional (also an unlikely result), foreign corporations must rely on case law as authority allowing them to lend
money to Illinois residents without qualifying to do business.
THE INSULATION METHOD

If the Illinois Supreme Court finds that the statute is
restricted to purchasing notes and is constitutional, a foreign corporation wishing to lend money to an Illinois resident, or wishing
to take security for an existing loan, may be able to do so by
the "insulation method. ' '141 The method is based on a combination of the Interstate Commerce Clause and principles of comity
requiring each state to respect contracts made under the laws
of sister states. The theory states that if an investment contract
and all incidental acts are made outside the local state such
out-of-state acts should not be considered the doing of business
locally. Hence, the local state should be bound to honor such
141
contracts.
The fact that a loan is secured by a mortgage on Illinois real
estate does not affect the locality of the business which is being
done. The rule is that a foreign corporation is not doing business
in Illinois within the meaning of the qualification statute when
a contract is made outside the state and is to be performed outside the state. 142 This is so because a mortgage is only incidental to a loan. Therefore, a foreign corporation is not subject
14 "
to the laws of the state where the real estate is located.
140. See Prather, What Constitutes Doing Business, 25 LE.AL BULL. 65
(1959).
141. Id. at 80. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §

311, comment f (1971): "Qualification statutes,' almost invariably, apply
only to business done in intrastate commerce within the state."
142. Higgin Mfg. Co. v. Foreman Bros. Banking Co., 222 Ill. App. 29
(1921); 20 C.J.S. Corporations § 1839 (1940); 36 AM. JUR. 2d Foreign
Corporations § 147 (1968); CCH 1 CORP. L. 1505 (1965).
143. Union Savings Bank v. DeMarco, 105 R.I. 592, 254 A.2d 81, 83
(1969); CCH 1 CORP. L. 1505 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 189, comment b (1971):
By way of contrast, the rule [that the law of the situs of the property controls] does not apply to contracts in which one party agrees
to lend the other money and the other promises to repay the loan
and also to give a mortgage on his land as security. Here the debt is
the principal thing in the minds of the parties, and the promise to
give the mortgage is accessory to the debt.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 195, comment

a (1971).
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Under the insulation theory a foreign corporation must make
sure no activity is performed within the state which could be
considered doing business. Within the list of prohibited activities
are maintaining an office or agent in Illinois and executing any
144
vital documents within the state.
There are few Illinois cases involving the insulation method.
In Higgins Mfg. Co. v. Foreman Bros. Banking Co.,14 5 an agent
in Illinois forwarded a contract for the purchase of goods to the
foreign corporation for its approval. The appellate court held
that the contract was not binding until approved out of state,
and thus was not a contract made within the state, but one made
144. Prather lists the following fifteen rules as precautions to be observed if a foreign corporation is relying on the insulation method.
Prather, What Constitutes Doing Business, 25 LEGAL BULL. 65, 81-82
(1959).
(1) First of all, do not negotiate for or enter into any one of
these interstate transactions without consulting the association's own
legal and tax counsel. In many instances, such counsel, in turn, will
consult legal and tax counsel in the state where "doing business"
is contemplated.
(2) Maintain no offices, employees, or agents in the local state.
(3) Minimize or avoid, if possible, relationships with originators,
servicers, mortgage companies and the like, which might support a
finding that they were acting as agent for the manager's institution.
(4) Deal directly with the makers or sellers of the mortgage or
participation in question, and not through a broker in that state.
Brokers have been held to be agents.
(5) Before any commitment to buy or participate in loans is
made, make certain that the maker or seller is obligated to make
the loans whether or not a commitment is issued by the manager's
institution.
(6) When servicing contracts are entered into, make the servicer
an independent contractor and spell this out in the servicing contract.
(7) Do not make initial negotiations and do not make any consummating agreements in the local state.
(8) Make sure that all contracts or commitments for the making, purchase or participation in mortgage loans spell out that the
terms thereof shall be governed by the home state of the manager's
institution.
(9) Limit, or eliminate, if possible, actual site inspections.
(10) Make certain, where purchasing a loan or participation,
that the original lender itself and any and all intervening parties
were fully qualified to do business in the local state, and, that kind
of business.
(11) Make sure that all contracts, commitments and documents
are fully executed, in every detail, in the home state of the manager's
institution, and that proper evidence of the place of execution is preserved.
(12) Whenever possible, make notes or obligations payable in the
home state of the manager's institution.
(13) Make certain that all purchases or participations in loans
and all disbursement of the funds are made in such home state.
(14) Bring any necessary foreclosure actions in the federal courts.
Here the diversity-of-citizenship ordinarily will justify that court as
a forum.
(15) Dispose of all property acquired in foreclosure as promptly
as possible, unless the local law permits foreign corporations to own
real estate without restrictions. In all events, avoid operation of
such properties as money-makers.
145. 222 Ill. App. 29 (lst Dist. 1921).
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in interstate commerce. As such, it was enforceable even though
the corporation had not qualified to do business in Illinois.14
In Industrial Acceptance Corp. v. Haering,147 an Indiana
corporation purchased commercial paper at a discount. The
paper was secured by chattel mortgages on automobiles sold by
Illinois Studebaker dealers. The notes had been offered to the
corporation for acceptance in Indiana.' 48 The appellate court

held that since the corporation had not maintained any office
in Illinois and had no agent here, the transaction, which was completed in Indiana, did not constitute the transaction
of business
40
in Illinois for purposes of the qualification law.'
Although these cases do not analyze the theory, they show
the willingness of the Illinois courts to follow the insulation
method.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND LENDING MONEY

A fundamental limitation on state qualification statutes
which effectively enables foreign corporations to enforce in-state
contracts is the commerce clause of the United States Constitution. 1'0 Foreign corporations engaged solely in interstate commerce in a particular state are not subject to the qualification
laws of that state.'' Illinois has both recognized and followed
this rule.'5 2 In a recent decision of the Illinois Supreme Court,
5 3
Charter Finance Co. v. Henderson,1'
Chief Justice Underwood,

writing for a unanimous court, took an extremely liberal view
of the application of the commerce clause to loans made by a
foreign corporation in Illinois.
In Charter, a Missouri finance company, with no office in
Illinois, was not subject to a doing business defense in a suit
brought on a promissory note of an Illinois resident and his
146. Id. at 35-36.

147. 253 Ill. App. 97 (3d Dist. 1929).

148. Id. at 99. There were two methods used. One was for the dealer
to send the note by mail endorsed to the Indiana corporation and have
the chattel mortgage assigned to the same corporation. If accepted, the
corporation sent its check to the dealer. The other method was for the
dealer to place the endorsed note and assigned mortgage in a draft envelope which was a sight draft drawn upon the Indiana corporation, payable at its Indiana bank. The papers were forwarded through banking
channels. The Indiana corporation inspected the papers before accepting
and paying. Id. at 100-01.
149. Id. at 105. The court also pointed out that negotiations for the
purchase and assignment of notes and chattel mortgages were carried
on in Indiana.
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
151. See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 98 (2d
ed. 1970); Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974); Eli Lilly
& Co. v. Sav-On-Drugs, Inc., 366 U.S. 276 (1961).
152. See Textile Fabric Corp. v. Roundtree, 39 Ill. 2d 122, 125, 233
N.E.2d 376, 378 (1968).
153. 60 Ill. 2d 323, 326 N.E.2d 372 (1975).
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wife.' 54 The record was unclear as to whether the note was
completed in Illinois or Missouri. 15 5 While the opinion did not
expressly discuss the legal effect of completing the contract in
Missouri, it implied that it would render the note fully enforceable. 156
The court discussed two alternate theories on which they
would uphold the note if it had been completed in Illinois. First,
the transaction could have been considered an isolated transaction which has consistently been held not to be doing business
in this state.' 57 Secondly, Chief Justice Underwood pointed out
that even if Charter's lending activities were to be considered
doing business in Illinois, it is arguable that "Charter's transactions with Illinois residents, involving the flow of money across
state lines, were contracts made for interstate commerce which
. . . Illinois courts cannot refuse to enforce."1 18
Chief Justice Underwood prefaced this judicial dictum with
the caveat: "Although we need not rule directly on the question,
it is at least arguable that . . ... 159 This caveat, however, does
not diminish the effect of the extremely liberal and significant
application of the commerce clause to this unsettled area of the
doing business law. In fact, the case read as a whole indicates
the receptivity of the Illinois Supreme Court to enforcing loans
made to Illinois residents by foreign corporations. The court
seemed to be deliberately going out of its way searching for
arguments which upheld the enforceability of the loan.
FOREIGN CORPORATIONS GOVERNED BY SPECIAL STATUTES

Apart from the doing business provisions of the Business
Corporation Act, Illinois has specific statutes dealing with specific foreign corporations which prescribe specific penalties for
failure to comply with specific licensing requirements. 16 0
Whatever the rule may be with respect to these specific corporations, it would seem to follow that foreign corporations governed
neither by penalty provisions of the Business Corporation Act
nor by other statutes, can engage in business in Illinois except
to the extent of the prohibitions of the 1953 amendment.6
154. Id. at 326-27, 326 N.E.2d at 375.
155.

Id.

159.

Id.

156. Id.
157. Id. at 327, 326 N.E.2d at 375.
158. Id. at 328, 326 N.E.2d at 376.
160. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 997 (1973) (unlicensed foreign savings and loan association is fined and all contracts made in this state
are void); id. ch. 73, § 733 (4) (1973) (unlicensed insurance company cannot maintain any action).
161. See text supra at section entitled "THE 1953
discussion of the scope of the 1953 amendment.

AMENDMENT"

for a
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To express this in simpler terms, if the corporation is
governed by a specific statute, so that the penalty provisions of
the Business Corporation Act are inapplicable, and if the specific
statute imposes no doing business penalty overriding the lending
statute, then the corporation's lending activities in Illinois are
governed only by the lending statute. For example, foreign state
banks are specifically excluded from the qualification provisions
of the Business Corporation Act.'6 2 Also, the Illinois Banking
Act,' 63 the specific statute governing banks, fails to provide a
penalty for unlicensed foreign banks. The result is to subject
such a bank only to the general provisions of the lending statute
and its 1953 amendment.
BRANCH BANKING AND FOREIGN LENDING

To say that branch banking is prohibited in Illinois is a gross
oversimplification and only partially true. It is clear that banks
chartered by the state of Illinois or established in other states
are prohibited by the Illinois Banking Act from branching in
Illinois.'6 4 The prohibition extends to establishment or maintenance by a bank of a "branch office or agency" to conduct
any of its business.16 5 This clearly prevents foreign banking
corporations from maintaining offices in Illinois to perform such
functions as soliciting loans, executing documents necessary for
loans, distributing funds, and accepting payments on loans. The
statute does not expressly prohibit the lending of money in
Illinois by a foreign state bank if it does not do so through an
illegal Illinois branch. It seems to be exclusively a branching
statute.
However, due to a 1968 amendment, the provision does not
apply to banks formed in other countries."6
The General
Assembly provided a limited licensing provision for these banks
in 1973 by passing a law which permits banks organized under
162. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.102 (1973).
163. Id. ch. 161/2, §§ 101-177.
164. Id., § 106 reads as follows:

No bank shall establish or maintain more than one banking
house, or receive deposits or pay checks at any other place than such
banking house, and no bank shall establish or maintain in this or
any other state of the United States any branch bank, nor shall it
establish or maintain in this State any branch office or additional
office or agency for the purpose of conducting any of its business.
For a discussion of the federal statutory policy followed by national
banks that wish to establish branches in a particular state, see Harth,

Additional Offices and Facilities of Savings Associations, 40 LEGAL BULL.
95, 98-100 (1974).
165. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 162, § 106 (1973).
166. The section was amended in 1968 by eliminating the restriction
against branch banking in any other "country" and added the words "of
the United States."
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the laws of a country other than the United States to establish
and maintain a single banking office in the central business district of Chicago upon receipt of a certificate of authority from
the Commissioner of Banks and Trust Companies. 16 7 Many
banks from other countries have taken advantage of this law and
have branch offices in downtown Chicago.""' The law contains
a reciprocity provision which may have supplied some incentive
for the General Assembly to generously open its arms to these
banks. 16 ' There is no reason why the General Assembly could
not provide for the licensing of all out-of-state banks, including
banks formed in sister states. Such an enactment could include
a provision of reciprocity as a condition for obtaining the license.
While the Illinois General Assembly has continually resisted
branch banking bills,'170 they have permitted the Illinois Commissioner of Savings and Loan Associations to provide for the
establishment of a "facility" by the Illinois state-chartered savings and loan associations "in the case of a supervisory merger,
consolidation or bulk sales; or, a single facility in the case of a
relocation.'

71

This amendment to the Savings and Loan Act

was enacted in 1971 in response to the competition generated by
a change in the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's (FHLBB)
policy. That change permitted federally chartered savings and
loan associations to open branches in states in which chain or
affiliate banking was being practiced, even though the state's
policy patently prohibited branching.1 72 A "facility" is not a
167. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16 , §§ 501-19 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975)
("The Foreign Banking Office Act").
168. According to the Office of the Commissioner of Banks and Trust
Companies, as of September 18, 1975, twenty banks from other countries
are currently licensed under this act.
169. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16 , § 503 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975) provides:
No such foreign banking corporation is, however, entitled to a certificate of authority under this Act unless, under the laws of the country under which such foreign banking corporation was organized, a
State bank and a national bank may be authorized to maintain a
banking office which may engage in a general banking business or
may be authorized to own all the shares (except for directors' qualifying shares) of a banking organization organized under the laws
of such country.
170. The 1970 Illinois Constitution, ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 8, provides
that the General Assembly may approve branch banking only if each
house approves it by three-fifths of the members voting or by a majority
of the members elected, whichever is greater.
171. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1973); SAVINGS & LOAN REGS.,
art. X, §§ 1-5 (1974). See note 174 infra.
172. See 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(b) (1) (1973); Harth, Additional Offices
and Facilities of Savings Associations, 40 LEGAL BULL. 95, 97-98 (1974);
Lyons Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 377 F. Supp.
11, 18-19 (N.D. Ill. 1974). The FHLBB was attempting to make federal
associations competitive with state associations. However, current statistics on savings associations in Illinois cited recently by the outgoing president of the Illinois Savings and Loan League, H. Thomas Dunk, indicate
that the "balance has swung toward the federals which claim some $15.5
billion in assets to $8.6 billion for state-chartered associations." Chicago

328 The John Marshall Journal of Practice and Procedure [Vol. 9:295
full service office, but it resembles one since it may conduct the
business of "receiving deposits, cashing and issuing checks, drafts
and money orders, changing money, processing mortgages and
receiving payments on existing indebtedness."' 17
This section
was amended further by the signing into law in September, 1975
of House Bill 1354, which permits state savings and loan associations to establish multiple "facilities" instead of being limited to
174
a single facility.
The section on establishment of facilities applies only to
Illinois savings and loan associations. Foreign state savings and
loan associations clearly cannot establish a facility under the
Illinois law. Foreign state savings and loan associations are governed by a separate licensing provision which penalizes associa1 75
tions which transact business in Illinois without a license.
Even though federal savings and loan associations located
in Illinois can receive approval to establish branches in Illinois,
the FHLBB has not generally extended the policy to permit
federal associations located in other states to cross state lines in
order to open branches in Illinois. 1 76 There is also a limitation
on the lending area of the federal association. It encompasses
the area in the state in which the association is located, as well
as any area outside the state within 100 miles of the association's
home office. 77 Thus a federal savings and loan association
located in Iowa, Wisconsin, Indiana, Missouri, Kentucky, or
Michigan has authority from the FHLBB to cross state lines to
lend money in Illinois if the loan is made within the 100 mile
17
lending area. 8
Sun-Times, Sept. 15, 1975, at 66, cols. 3-5. Mr. Dunk also pointed out
that the asset size ratio between the two groups in Illinois shifted from
a one to one ratio three years ago to a current two to one ratio in favor
of the federal associations. The General Assembly has responded. See
note 174 infra.
173. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(c) (1973) (emphasis added). The
section was amended in 1973 to permit facilities to process mortgages.
Pub. Act 78-943, amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(c) (1971).
174. The second sentence of ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 709(b) (1973)
was amended by House Bill 1354 to read:
The Commissioner may adopt regulations which provide for the
establishment of facilities [a facility], as defined by the Commissioner, in the case of mergers, consolidations [a supervisory merger,
consolidation] or bulk sales [sale]; or, facilities [a single facility]
in the case of relocations [a relocation].
House Bill 1354 was signed into law by the Governor on September 12,
1975.
175. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 997 (1973). See text at note 183 infra.

176. See Harth, Additional Offices and Facilities of Savings Associa-

tions, 40 LEGAL BULL. 95, 111 (1974).
177. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-6 (1973).
178. With respect to national banks, because Congress chose to defer
to the state's branch banking policies, there has been incessant litigation
and bickering over what constitutes "branching." For example, Illinois
Attorney General William Scott, in a recent suit filed against The First
National Bank of Chicago in the United States District Court (N.D. Ill.),
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Because of the general prohibition in Illinois against branching across state lines, state and federally chartered banks and
savings and loan associations outside Illinois, beyond the 100 mile
lending area, must look to other sources of authority for enforcing loans made to Illinois residents. The insulation method effectively protects a foreign banking corporation or foreign savings
and loan association that observes the precautions heretofore
suggested. 1' 9 However, for a foreign corporation or association
charged with failing to observe one or more of these detailed
requirements, the lending statute will provide a sturdy second
line of defense.
A CRITIQUE OF THE PRESENT "DOING BUSINESS" SITUATION

The law of doing business in Illinois is a treacherous strait
teeming with hidden hazards through which counsel must safely
steer the corporate vessel. While safe passage cannot be charted
with precision, the more prominent features of the legal topography can be mapped out and some important questions can be
asked.
(1) It is obvious that there is more money outside Illinois
than in it. Much of it is in banks, both state and national. State
banks cannot qualify to do business in Illinois. Since this article
presents the first and only challenge to the Amendment of 1953,
and since the last word concerning the amendment's validity has
yet to be spoken by the courts, foreign state banks lending on
Illinois real estate must be content with the insulation method.
However, compliance with the requirements of that method is
a nightmare. 180 In the case of a multi-million dollar loan, counsel cannot expect forgiveness if he slips and loses his opportunity
to enforce foreclosure of the mortgage.""
Thus, elaborate
precautions tend to become more and more elaborate.
took the stand that five customer-bank communications terminals
(CBCTs), in locations to serve the bank's payroll customers, are illegal

branch banks. Chicago Daily News, Sept. 24, 1975, at 60, col. 1. "First

National responded in a lashing statement that such a view was 'the most
restrictive interpretation to date of Illinois' archaic banking laws and ignores the interest of consumer.'" Id. Earlier on July 31, 1975 the Independent Bankers Ass'n of America obtained an injunction invalidating
the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency's prior ruling that CBCTs were not

branches. Id. Judge Hubert L. Will ruled on December 10, 1975 in favor
of the Illinois Attorney General, holding that the CBCTs are branch
banks. Chicago Daily News, Dec. 10, 1975, at 1, col. 8. It is certainly a
legitimate inference that, with this type of experience before it, Congress
wisely chose to insulate federal savings and loan associations from state
branching laws.
179. See note 144 supra.
180. Id.
181. The 1953 amendment, to be sure, imposes no penalties for doing
a lending business in Illinois. But it is expressive of a legislative intention. See In re Diversified Dev. Corp., 341 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1965).
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(2)

Where a construction loan is executed in Illinois with

an Illinois lender who makes the initial construction disbursements, the loan can be assigned to a New York state bank for
completion of disbursement. In such a situation legal protection
could result from ,acceptance of the amended version of the lending statute which permits a foreign lender to purchase Illinois
loans.
(3) As to foreign state savings and loan associations, Illinois
is left with an antiquated statute stemming from the debacle of
the national building and loan associations scandal of the nine1 83
teenth century.18 2 Loans that violate the statute are void.
According to regulations issued by the FHLBB, competing federal savings and loan associations can cross state lines as long
as they remain within their lending area.18 4 Some states expressly sanction this practice and treat foreign federal associa185
tions as if they were domestic savings and loan associations.
Although Illinois does not have such a provision, it does give
a competitive advantage to foreign federal associations vis-a-vis
foreign state associations.10
(4) When national banks, located outside Illinois, wish to
lend money in Illinois, the law is again murky. The published
material is inconclusive and lacking in depth. Unpublished
memoranda prepared by counsel for large national banks are
extant, but also leave the matter shrouded in doubt, as one of
the authors (Professor Kratovil) can attest. In consequence,
some states have adopted legislation excluding national banks
from the requirement of obtaining a certificate as a foreign
financial institution before allowing them to make loans and
carry on other banking business.8 7 As pointed out above, the
Illinois qualification statute expressly excludes banks from its
scope, and there is no general statute in Illinois under which foreign state or national banks may be certified to do business in
Illinois. Therefore, Illinois legislation does nothing to clarify the
182. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 997 (1973).

See text at note 49 supra.
183. Id.
184. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-6 (1973).
185. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 534.31 (West Supp. 1975); S.D. COMP.
LAWS § 52-11-8 (1967). These statutes provide that federal savings and
loan associations located out of state are not foreign corporations.
Further, the statutes give the federals all of the rights, powers and privileges provided to domestic associations.
186. Since the power of the FHLBB has been held to be preemptive

over state law, (see Springfield Institution for Say. v. Worcester Fed.

Say. & Loan Ass'n, 329 Mass. 184, 107 N.E.2d 315 (1952), cert. denied,

344 U.S. 884 (1952)), and since ILL. REV.

STAT. ch. 32, § 997 (1973) apparently only applies to foreign state savings and loan associations, the federal associations are not subject to the penalties of this section when doing business in Illinois without a license.
187. E.g., REV. CODE OF WASH. ANN. §§ 30.04.010, 30.04.290 (BancroftWhitney &West 1961).
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uncertainty surrounding loans by national banks located outside
the state.
(5) The Model Business Corporation Act has attempted to
introduce a statutory measure of logic and order into the chaos
of court decisions on doing business.18 Illinois has no such
legislation.
(6) Recently the Director of the Illinois Department of
Registration and Education, Robert E. Stackler, in response to
charges by community groups that out-of-state mortgage firms
are involved in "fast foreclosure" of residental real estate mortgages, issued regulations for the licensing and regulation of outof-state mortgage bankers and brokers.' 8 9 One of the prerequisites of doing a mortgage business in Illinois would be that the
firm must have an office in the state. The validity of such regulations when adopted must be tested in court, and even now,
the authority of the director to license such firms has come
under attack. 10 0 Regardless of their validity, these regulations
would not affect foreign lenders making large commercial loans
unrelated to residential real estate.
This outline could be expanded. As it stands, it indicates
that the State of Illinois has been neither progressive nor comprehensive in clarifying the doing business problem.
CONCLUSION

It is obvious that the Illinois law on the subject of foreign
corporate lending is in need of clarification. A test case is needed
to determine the validity of the 1953 amendment to the lending
statute. If, as seems extremely probable, the amendment cannot
withstand attack, then decisions must be made by the General
Assembly. A first step would require the General Assembly to
consider adoption of a clarified version of § 106 (2) of the Model
Business Corporation Act.'"
A second step would involve reconsideration of our anti1 92
quated legislation on foreign building and loan associations.
If a federal savings and loan association, operating within its
lending area, can operate across state lines, it is difficult to comprehend why a foreign state association should be placed at a
competitive disadvantage.
188. See note 3 supra.
189. Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 21, 1975, at 126, cols. 1-3; id., Oct. 20,
1975, at 1, cols. 3-4.
190. Mr. Leonard Giblin, president of the Chicago Mortgage Banker's
Ass'n has questioned the authority of the department to license mortgage
brokers. Chicago Sun-Times, Aug. 21, 1975, at 126, col. 2.
191. See note 3 supra.

192. See text at note 182 supra.
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A third step would require the General Assembly to face
up realistically to the economics of the problem. Does Illinois
really want to encourage foreign corporate lending? Will it
insist on giving local lenders a "piece of the action" so that
foreign lenders must buy loans from local lenders and pay
tribute for the privilege of lending money to Illinois borrowers?
What happens if local sources dry up and foreign lenders are
reluctant to pay tribute? The law of 1875 was enacted to lure
desperately needed foreign money to Illinois. Is the situation
different today? Must we continue playing games by having
local lenders disburse their own funds for initial construction
loans and thereafter assign the mortgages to foreign lenders for
the remaining disbursements? Must we continue the ritual rain
dance of the insulation method?
Illinois borrowers as a group are unrelated and disunited,
having little or no lobbying power in Springfield. This contrasts
sharply with the well-organized and influential lobbying groups
of Illinois lenders. It is hoped that the General Assembly will
give fair and impartial consideration to the legitimate needs of
Illinois borrowers. Their needs are not necessarily opposed to
the interests of Illinois lenders. It is submitted that clarification
of the law in Illinois and encouragement of out-of-state lenders
to make loans to Illinois borrowers will lead to more commercial
growth and expansion in Illinois which will ultimately benefit
Illinois financial institutions by the money supply and investment income it generates. The General Assembly and Illinois
lenders must take a wider view of the ultimate benefits to be
gained by encouraging the flow of outside money into Illinois
rather than a narrow view designed to protect a particular
special interest group.

